



OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE CIRCULATION

POLICE MANAGEMENT OF INCIDENTS INVOLVING WHITE POWDER OR OTHER SUSPICIOUS SUBSTANCES

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A handwritten signature in black ink that reads 'G.F. Byrne'.

OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE CIRCULATION

Operational Guidance from Police National CBRN Centre

Police Management of Incidents Involving White Powder or other Suspicious Substances

This document has been produced by the Police National CBRN Centre (PN CBRN C). It is Operational Guidance considered as good practice by the PN CBRN C.

The guidance will be updated as appropriate in accordance with development of policy and tactics, or legislative changes.

This document has been produced in consultation with:

Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE)
Defence Science Technology Laboratory (Dstl)
National Ambulance Resilience Unit (NARU)
National CBRN Practitioners Group (inc. UK Police, Fire & Ambulance Reps)
National Network of Laboratories (NNL)
National Resilience Assurance Team (NRAT)
SO15 Counter Terrorism Command

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1. Introduction

- 1.1.** This document should be read in conjunction with the "Initial Operational Response to a CBRN Incident" guidance document (from this point on referred to as IOR Guidance). The IOR Guidance provides vital information to non-specialist responders.
- 1.2.** This document provides the overarching national framework for the Police Management of incidents involving White Powder or other Suspicious Substances. It is recognised that there will be local and national variations within England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales allowing for differences in terminology and the relationships between emergency service partners.
- 1.3.** This document also describes the process by which the Police, in partnership with the other emergency services, determine a safe, proportionate and consistent response to an incident involving suspicious substances, excluding substances known or believed to be drugs or explosives.
- 1.4.** If, at any stage, it is suspected that an incident involves an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) or a substance that is believed to be explosive then this threat has a greater priority and local Emergency Service bomb threat plans should be activated immediately. If it is suspected that CBRN material is also present then this operational guidance should be considered for when the explosive threat is negated.
- 1.5.** This guidance, whilst designed for the Police management of such incidents, is aimed at all those engaged in planning for or responding to events that involve potential hazardous materials or that require a CBRN contingency.
- 1.6.** Whilst the majority of these types of incidents dealt with by the Police are classified as non-explosive white powder, the terminology and procedures applied must be robust and sufficiently flexible to deal with the potential threat that may come from any non-explosive powders, (of any colour), solids, liquids, gels, crystals or granules.

- 1.7.** Whilst experience shows that the majority of incidents involve letters/postal packages, the procedures adopted must be flexible enough to consider wide-ranging types of containers or methods of delivery.

- 1.8.** It is imperative that the response to such reports is proportionate to the assessed threat. Adherence to this guidance will avoid escalation of resources beyond what is sensible or justifiable. It may also highlight the need to pass operational lead to a more suitable agency, e.g. FRS, Local Authority or Environment Agency for incidents involving HAZMAT or accidental contamination incidents.

- 1.9.** Detailed procedures for dealing with an incident that is confirmed as a genuine CBRN attack are beyond the scope of this document. In these circumstances reference should be made to local CBRN Response Plans.

2. Definitions

- 2.1.** WHITE POWDER - A suspicious unidentified powder, of any colour, that is known to be neither explosives nor drugs.

- 2.2.** SUSPICIOUS SUBSTANCE - A suspicious unidentified solid, liquid, gel, crystal, organic or granular material, of any colour, not believed to be explosive or drugs.

- 2.3.** HAZARDOUS MATERIALS (HAZMAT) - Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) Operational Guidance defines the term hazardous materials, also referred to as dangerous/hazardous substances or goods, as solids, liquids, or gases that can harm people, other living organisms, property, or the environment. They not only include materials that are toxic, radioactive, flammable, explosive, corrosive, oxidizers, asphyxiates, biohazards, pathogen or allergen substances and organisms, but also materials with physical conditions or other characteristics that render them hazardous in specific circumstances, such as compressed gases and liquids, or hot/cold materials.

3. Human Rights

- 3.1.** The content of this document takes cognisance of the legality, necessity, proportionality and transparency relevant to human rights legislation. To comply with the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights as enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998, the Police will carry out their responsibilities to protect individuals' rights.
- 3.2.** If there is a requirement to interfere with the rights of an individual, it will only be undertaken:
- Where the law allows;
 - Where it is necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of others, prevent crime and disorder, protect the health and morals of others;
 - Where it is in the interests of national security, or for public safety; and
 - Where the means used to achieve the objective will balance the general interests of the community against the rights of the individual, and will use the least intrusive option available to meet the objective.

4. Strategy

4.1. The agreed strategic intention, as set out in national doctrine, is to coordinate effective multi-agency activity in order to:

- Preserve and protect lives
- Mitigate and minimise the impact of the incident
- Inform the public and maintain public confidence
- Prevent, deter and detect crime, and
- Assist an early return to a new normality

4.2. Other important common objectives flowing from this strategy are:

- Ensure the health and safety of those responding to the incident
- Safeguard the environment
- Facilitate judicial, public, technical or other inquiries
- Evaluate the response and identify lessons to be learned and prevent, deter and detect further incidents.

5. Multi-Agency Interoperability

5.1. INITIAL OPERATIONAL RESPONSE (IOR)

- 5.1.1. The Initial Operational Response (IOR) includes all operational personnel (not deployed/equipped as CBRN specialists) from any Emergency Service or NHS Primary Health Care premises that may be required to carry out the role of a first responder.
- 5.1.2. It also, fundamentally includes control room staff in Call Handling or Resource Allocators and Dispatchers.
- 5.1.3. The IOR Guidance provides vital information to non-specialist responders and should be read in conjunction with this document.

5.2. COMMAND, CONTROL, CO-ORDINATION (C3)

- 5.2.1. It is vital that a command structure proportionate to the incident response is established and interoperable at Operational, Tactical and Strategic level where necessary.
- 5.2.2. It will be the responsibility of multi-agency commanders to agree a Joint Dynamic Hazard Assessment (JDHA) as well as their own agency specific Dynamic Risk Assessments (DRA).

5.3. MULTI-AGENCY SPECIALIST RESOURCES

- 5.3.1. The emergency services maintain specialist assets that, when deployed, provide a multi-agency capability to respond to a suspected / potential / confirmed CBRN incident.
- 5.3.2. Local/regional agreements such as collaborations/partnerships/alliances may be considered to deliver a proportionate response to incidents involving white powder or other suspicious substances. This may involve the forming of a small, dynamic, multi-agency team of CBRN specialists from each emergency service to deploy together to deliver a single collaborative response.

- 5.3.3. **Police Service Role** - The Police will coordinate the multi-agency response and ensure that a permissive environment exists for the FRS and Ambulance Service (AS) to deliver their respective specialist capabilities.
- 5.3.3.1. The threat assessment will be coordinated by the Police who have the capability to access, analyse and disseminate information and intelligence.
- 5.3.3.2. Forensic management of incident scenes will be considered should criminal intent or terrorism be suspected. Section 3.3 highlights particular considerations around Forensic Management and the deployment of multi-agency resources.
- 5.3.3.3. It will be a matter for individual Police Forces to consider the use of their own Detection, Identification, Monitoring (DIM) capability in conjunction with the FRS to carry out initial scene assessment, under Police supervision to mitigate the risk of forensic evidential loss.
- 5.3.4. **Fire & Rescue Service (FRS) Role** - In the context of white powder or other suspicious substances the FRS will support the Police Service with specific specialist assets.
- 5.3.4.1. The FRS, as part of its core role, responds to HAZMAT incidents, which includes any incident involving unidentified substances. Included in this are any incidents classified as being potentially CBRN in nature, which may share many of the same characteristics and procedures with the highest level HAZMAT response.
- 5.3.4.2. When requested to attend an incident, the nature and seriousness of the circumstances will determine the level of specialist assets that the FRS will provide and the range of resources and personnel they may deploy.

- 5.3.4.3. Detection, Identification and Monitoring (DIM) equipment could be provided by the FRS. A range of DIM equipment is available on a regional basis along with suitably trained and qualified DIM Advisers. Additionally, most FRS' have Hazardous Material and Environmental Protection Officers (HMEPOs) who can provide advice and guidance on dealing with incidents involving hazardous materials. If sampling of the suspicious substance at the scene is appropriate, this could be carried out by forensically aware FRS personnel.
- 5.3.4.4. The FRS may make use of DIM equipment to facilitate its own response to any incident involving hazardous material.
- 5.3.4.5. The FRS may assign a National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer (NILO) to the incident to provide advice, either at scene or remotely, around FRS capacity and capability to support incident resolution.
- 5.3.5. **Ambulance Service (AS) Role** - In the context of White Powder or other Suspicious Substances, whereby people are affected and/or injured the AS will provide resources commensurate to the threat/hazard. This may include specific, specialist response capability.
 - 5.3.5.1. The AS is responsible for coordinating the health service response to the site of a CBRN release.
 - 5.3.5.2. On behalf of the Department of Health, the AS is responsible for the decontamination of people exposed to a CBRN release.
 - 5.3.5.3. AS commanders in consultation with partner agencies will decide on the need for decontamination, and where appropriate may ask the FRS to carry out mass decontamination. The AS will undertake the triage and clinical decontamination of all ill or injured people exposed to a CBRN release, including those responders affected by the release.

- 5.3.5.4. The AS may assign a National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer (NILO) / Tactical Advisor to the incident to provide advice, either at scene or remotely, around AS capacity and capability to support incident resolution.
- 5.3.5.5. The AS may also provide a Hazardous Area Response Team (HART) to the scene.
- 5.3.5.6. HART will provide triage and treatment within the Hot Zone to patients exposed to a CBRN release, as well as providing clinical support and advice to responding agencies.
- 5.3.5.7. HART will also provide Recognition of Life Extinct (ROLE) in the event of fatalities in the Hot Zone.
- 5.3.5.8. A Specialist Operations Response Team (SORT) may also be deployed. SORT is drawn from AS personnel who have the necessary skills and knowledge to provide clinical decontamination at an incident. They have the ability to work within the warm zone in conjunction with HART¹.

5.4. FORENSIC MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

- 5.4.1. Whilst life saving activity is of the highest priority, all responders from all agencies must ensure that staff movements in and out of a scene are recorded.
- 5.4.2. Where responders are the first contact with a witness/casualty within a scene they should be aware of the need to pass on information provided by them to Police investigators immediately.
- 5.4.3. Responders should take all steps to prevent cross contamination. The same staff at one scene should not be sent to a second without first taking measures to change clothing, PPE and discussing this with Police scene managers.

¹ In Scotland, SORT also provides a capability similar to HART.

- 5.4.4. They should take all possible steps to avoid damage to forensic evidence and only take such action as is necessary to preserve life and mitigate the hazard. Where capability exists, consideration should be given to recording the scene via still or video imagery.

- 5.4.5. If DIM equipment, is to be introduced to a scene, an audit trail of activity from cleaning and calibration through to result generation should be generated to provide investigators an evidential chain of events.

6. Assessment & Response Protocol

6.1. INITIAL ASSESSMENT (IA)

- 6.1.1. As soon as possible following notification of an incident, a Police Control Room Inspector/Duty Officer/Force Incident Manager (FIM), in the absence of a Police CBRN Commander and/or CBRN Tactical Advisor, will be responsible for carrying out an Initial Assessment (IA) in consultation with multi-agency partners. This assessment will be based on the information and circumstances surrounding the incident that has been established at that time, e.g. initial report, circumstances, intelligence, modus operandi, symptoms of affected people, etc. Appendix 'A' provides specific considerations for White Powder/Suspicious Substances incidents whilst following the Joint Decision Model (JDM).
- 6.1.2. If at any point during the ongoing assessment of an incident, it is suspected that the item or substance may be explosive in nature or may in fact be some form of incendiary or Improvised Explosive Device (IED), the relevant force procedures in relation to bomb threat assessment must be followed.
- 6.1.3. Early multi-agency information sharing is essential, particularly amongst the emergency services who may also be preparing for a response to the incident or indeed have prior knowledge of the incident.
- 6.1.4. The use of Multi-Agency Interoperability Talk Groups provides the emergency services with the ability to share information and discuss tactical options even before significant resources are deployed. Advice should be sought from local advisors in this field.
- 6.1.5. The following departments within Police forces should be considered a valuable source of information/intelligence during the IA process:
- Force/Local Intelligence Operatives
 - Force CBRN Single Point of Contact (SPOC)

- Emergency Planning Units
- 6.1.6. Consultation with the relevant geographical Counter Terrorist Unit's (CTU) or Counter Terrorist Intelligence Unit's (CTIU) Single Points of Entry (SPOE) is essential in all cases, even where the Police officers initially receiving the information believe the incident to be a false alarm or hoax and can see no evidence of a genuine threat.
- 6.1.7. The Police National CBRN Operations Centre (PN-CBRN Ops Centre) (Section 7) should also be informed of the incident, regardless of severity, to ensure that national trends are taken into account as part of the IA process.
- 6.1.8. It may also be appropriate to liaise with SO15 Counter Terrorist Command Reserve Desk to ensure that a national intelligence picture is considered.
- 6.1.9. The officer completing the IA must also consider the health & safety of all responders attending the incident as part of an IOR, particularly with regard to the potential risk associated with unknown substances. Reference should be made to the section "IDENTIFY A POTENTIAL CBRN INCIDENT" from the IOR Guidance document.
- 6.1.10. The IA must be a quick process, even though initial information may be sparse. It does not involve making or waiting for the result of lengthy or detailed enquiries. IOR officers/staff must be made aware if the intelligence is authenticated or not.
- 6.1.11. The IA result and any known information/intelligence should be passed to the officers/staff even if more detailed enquiries are ongoing in order to establish the appropriate level of specialist response required to resolve the incident.
- 6.1.12. If the Police have a suspect in custody then consideration should be given to the use of Police powers in relation to urgent interviews on the grounds of health and safety of affected public and responders.

6.2. SAFETY TRIGGERS FOR EMERGENCY PERSONNEL (STEP 1-2-3 Plus)

6.2.1. In accordance with the IOR Guidance document, the IA must take into account all information concerning affected persons which provides a good indicator of the likelihood of hazardous materials being present.

6.2.2. This can be achieved using the **STEP 1-2-3 Plus** protocol:

STEP 1: *One person incapacitated with no obvious reason*

- *Approach using standard protocols*

STEP 2: *Two people incapacitated with no obvious reason*

- *Approach with caution using standard protocols*

STEP 3: *Three or more people in close proximity, incapacitated with no obvious reason*

- *Use caution and follow Plus*

Plus: *Consider what actions can be undertaken to save life, using the following principles:*

Evacuate – *get people away from the scene of contamination*

Communicate and Advise – *immediate medical advice and reassurance that help is on its way*

Disrobe – *remove clothing*

Decontamination – *dry decontamination² should be the default process for non caustic chemicals*

6.2.3. It must be remembered that symptoms of exposure to a biological or radiological attack may not be present within the first minutes and hours of an attack occurring. Chemical releases are often, but not always accompanied by a more rapid onset of symptoms.

6.2.4. In any event, it is important to provide reassurance to affected persons to minimise the impact of psychosomatic symptoms which, if not checked, have the potential to have a significant impact on the

² Refer to IOR Guidance for details around decontamination including wet decontamination

emergency services both at the scene and at destinations such as Hospital Emergency Departments and General Practitioner's surgeries.

6.3. REPORTING MODEL (METHANE)

6.3.1. In line with JESIP principles and to assist in deciding on a proportionate specialist response, the METHANE protocol should be applied. The gathering of information at the scene by the first IOR personnel from any of the emergency services will also be critical in ensuring an appropriate response (see Appendix 'Bi').

6.4. SUBSTANCE CHARACTERISTICS (BAD COLDS ACT)

6.4.1. Information from initial reports regarding the characteristics of any substances causing concern will help to categorise and/or subsequently identify it. The acronym BAD COLDS ACT may be used to support this process even prior to the deployment of specialist resources (see Appendix 'Bii').

6.5. DECIDING ON A PROPORTIONATE RESPONSE

6.5.1. The IA and continued evaluation of information obtained by the IOR are absolutely vital in order to avoid escalating a situation that may have a logical explanation or to respond safely to an incident that may pose a genuine threat.

6.5.2. In line with JESIP principles, the Joint Decision Model (JDM) (see Appendix 'A'), should be followed to ensure that any action taken by the emergency services is based on a commonly understood and agreed information picture.

6.5.3. The importance of gathering accurate information cannot be overemphasised, as this will form the basis for deciding the specialist response, if any, for the incident.

6.5.4. The assessment of all available information/intelligence is essential to ensure the most appropriate response is delivered. Control Room

personnel, particularly those employed on call-handling duties, will be an essential part of this process. The "INITIAL CALL HANDLING" section from the IOR Guidance document provides a suggested call-handling process to obtain information required.

- 6.5.5. Following consideration of the IA and subsequent reports from the IOR, the Police must consider whether it is necessary to escalate the response. The emergency services must continue to communicate to allow each agency to determine the most appropriate response from their respective organisation dependant upon the functional needs of the incident.
- 6.5.6. A "**STANDARD RESPONSE**" (Section 6.6) does not require specialist resources and will not routinely need the support of the FRS or AS. The incident remains a Local Policing matter and managed accordingly unless local arrangements exist, as per Section 5.3.2.
- 6.5.7. In deciding upon a response, other than "**STANDARD RESPONSE**", it is essential that an accredited Police CBRN Commander, supported by a CBRN Tactical Advisor takes command of the incident.
- 6.5.8. The Police CBRN Commander must, in consultation with FRS and AS, agree the JDHA and the proportionate deployment of specialist resources/assets to support the ongoing IOR.
- 6.5.9. In doing so, the response level is effectively raised to "**AMBER RESPONSE**" (Section 6.10) but still remains proportionate to the circumstances surrounding the incident.
- 6.5.10. The level of specialist resources/assets should be incremental and solely dependant on the functional requirements on scene or the intelligence/threat assessment remotely. Therefore, de-escalation should not be necessary if accurate situation reports (Sitreps) are shared by the emergency services, either on scene or remotely.

- 6.5.11. The Police CBRN Commander, in consultation with partner agencies, will need to determine whether the incident requires a **"RED RESPONSE"** (Section 6.11) and declared as a "CBRN Incident".

6.6. "STANDARD RESPONSE"

Where the threat is non-authenticated;
Whether the package/container is open or not;
Whether the substance has been spilled or not
AND
Following the IA of all available information and intelligence;
There is no CBRN threat or risk associated with the item or substance and a standard response is the most appropriate, proportionate and reasonable response
A specialist response is not routinely required in these circumstances

See Appendix 'C' for further details and information relating to a **"STANDARD RESPONSE"**

6.7. NO CRIMINAL INTENT

If it is assessed that there is no criminal intent, no further Police action is required, other than general public reassurance.

6.8. CRIMINAL INTENT

- 6.8.1. If it is assessed that there is criminal intent in the incident, then it must be treated accordingly in line with National Crime Recording Standards. Procedures for crime scene management, investigation and recording of crime must be applied. This includes appropriate methods of preservation, recovery and production of evidence.
- 6.8.2. When operating at the **"STANDARD RESPONSE"**, it is likely that existing methods for packaging exhibits/productions will be appropriate, e.g. drugs.

- 6.8.3. It is important to note that non-CBRN trained personnel will also need to be reassured that a detailed consideration of the information/intelligence has been carried out and that no threat/risk is perceived through ongoing handling of the substance.
- 6.8.4. Police Forces could consider the use of the following capabilities (if available) to reassure their personnel:
- Police DIM equipment
 - Drugs Expert Field Test Kits
 - Forensic Field Test Kits
 - Drug Detection Dog
- 6.8.5. Due cognisance must be given to the need for evidence preservation (e.g. DNA and fingerprints).
- 6.8.6. The recovering officer or Crime Scene Investigator (CSI) recovering the item or substance will determine what techniques or containers are required to recover the item.
- 6.8.7. If doubt remains additional support/advice may be sought from a CBRN Tactical Advisor, CBRN Supervisor/Responder, CBRN SPOC or Force Health and Safety Advisor.
- 6.8.8. In the unlikely event that any suspicion remains or is introduced regarding the threat posed by the item/substance, there is no option but to implement an **"AMBER RESPONSE"**, (Section 6.10)

6.9. ESCALATION OF THE RESPONSE

- 6.9.1. If any element of risk or suspicion is introduced surrounding the item/substance then the procedures as described in the **"AMBER RESPONSE"** should be adopted, (Section 6.10).

- 6.9.2. If at any point it is confirmed that an actual "CBRN EVENT" has occurred, the incident should be escalated to a "**RED RESPONSE**", (Section 6.11).

6.10. "AMBER RESPONSE"

Where the threat is non-authenticated;
Whether the package/container is open or not;
Whether the substance has been spilled or not;
AND
Following the IA of all available information and intelligence;

There is enough evidence to indicate reasonable suspicion to justify caution and to merit an additional multi-agency response to bring the incident to a safe conclusion

See Appendix 'D' for further details and information relating to an "**AMBER RESPONSE**".

6.11. CONFIRMATION OF A CBRN EVENT

- 6.11.1. The results of the initial screening by specialist resources/assets will assist the CBRN Operational Commander, supported by a CBRN Tactical Advisor, to formulate resolution options.
- 6.11.2. Should the result of the initial screening indicate that the substance is not CBRN then the incident may be de-escalated to a "**STANDARD RESPONSE**" (Section 6.6).
- 6.11.3. This does not preclude the incident being identified as a HAZMAT incident and operational lead moving to a more appropriate agency/organisation with overall co-ordination remaining with the Police.
- 6.11.4. Following initial screening, if any doubt remains scientific advice must be sought from the appropriate agency, via the PN-CBRN Ops Centre, (Section 7).

- 6.11.5. Should the result of the initial screening identify the substance as possibly being CBRN then the incident should be escalated to a **"RED RESPONSE"**, (Section 6.12).
- 6.11.6. Should the result of the initial screening be inconclusive then the incident should remain as an **"AMBER RESPONSE"** with continued emphasis on a proportionate use of specialist resources/assets.
- 6.11.7. In these circumstances, the National Network of Laboratories (NNL) should be considered by the host Police force and activated via the PN-CBRN Ops Centre (Section 7).

6.12. "RED RESPONSE"

Where the threat is authenticated;
Whether the package/container is open or not;
Whether the substance has been spilled or not,
AND
Following the IA of all available information and intelligence;

There is sufficient evidence to indicate that a CBRN event has occurred and an extremely high degree of caution is required, including additional multi-agency (in certain cases military) co-operation and activity is necessary to bring the incident to a safe conclusion.

See Appendix E for further details and information relating to a **"RED RESPONSE"**

7. Police National CBRN Operations Centre (PN CBRN OPS CENTRE)

- 7.1.** The Police National CBRN Operations Centre is available on a 24/7 basis to offer advice and assistance on any suspected/potential/actual CBRN related matter. This includes any incident that is relevant within the scope of this guidance document.
- 7.2.** The PN CBRN Ops Centre acts as a portal to advice from whoever the best source may be. This could be from within the PN CBRN C or from a wide range of outside sources including government and private sector agencies.
- 7.3.** The PN CBRN Ops Centre also collates information from incidents and exercises nationally. From this collation, the Centre is able to identify good practice, which can be shared with other forces facing similar situations and identify future training needs.
- 7.4.** The ability to deploy liaison officers to force areas may also be available. This could be to observe and assist in pre-planned events or exercises or alternatively to be deployed spontaneously to incidents as an aid to the local commander and as a link to the PN CBRN C and/or wider CBRN agencies.
- 7.5.** In summary, support can be provided in relation to:
- Planning;
 - Pre-event profiling and support;
 - Technical and tactical expertise;
 - Liaison officers at the Strategic, Tactical and Operational Level;
 - Support to the NNL process;
 - Supply of specialist detection equipment;
 - Supply of "Russian Doll", CB transportation boxes;
 - Deployment of the national reserve of CBRN equipment;
 - Exercise support.

7.6. Contact details for the PN CBRN Ops Centre are as follows:

- Tel: 0845 000 6382 (24/7 Hotline)
- E-mail: cbrnopscentre@college.pnn.police.uk

8. Acronyms

AS	- Ambulance Service
AWE	- Atomic Weapons Establishment
C3	- Command, Control, Co-ordination
CSI	- Crime Scene Investigator
CTU	- Counter Terrorist Unit
CTIU	- Counter Terrorist Intelligence Unit
DIM	- Detection, Identification, Monitoring
Dstl	- Defence Science Technology Laboratory
DRA	- Dynamic Risk Assessment
EOD	- Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FEL	- Forensic Explosive Laboratory
FIM	- Force Incident Manager
FRS	- Fire and Rescue Service
HART	- Hazardous Area Response Team
HAZMAT	- Hazardous Material
HMEPO	- Hazardous Material & Environmental Protection Officer
IA	- Initial Assessment
IED	- Improvised Explosive Device
IOR	- Initial Operational Response
JDHA	- Joint Dynamic Hazard Assessment
JDM	- Joint Decision Model
JESIP	- Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme
NHS	- National Health Service
NILO	- National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer
NNL	- National Network of Laboratories
PPE	- Personal Protective Equipment
PSNI	- Police Service of Northern Ireland
ROLE	- Recognition of Life Extinct
SORT	- Special Operations Response Team
SPOC	- Single Point of Contact
SPOE	- Single Point of Entry
STEP123plus	- Safety Triggers for Emergency Personnel

9. Appendix A – Joint Decision Model Plus Considerations



10. Appendix B(i) – Reporting Model (“METHANE”)

M	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Major Incident declared?
E	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exact Location
T	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Type of Incident
H	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Hazards present or suspected
A	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Access – routes that are safe to use
N	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Number, type, severity of casualties
E	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Emergency services present and those required

11. Appendix B(ii) – Substance Characteristics (“BAD COLDS ACT”)

B ehaviour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What did the substance behave like? • Did it fall to the floor in a soggy lump or behave like smoke vaporising into thin air?
A ppearance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is it powder like or granular or crystalline? • How much is there? Golf ball, cricket ball, basketball?
D issemination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How was it disseminated? Thrown, sprayed or mechanically spread?
C olour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is it pure white or off white or yellow? • Is it multi-coloured?
O odour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did it smell?³ (washing powder or chemical pungent smell?)
L ikeness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does it look like something you know? (such as talcum powder or washing powder with blue specks?)
D eliberate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did the spreading of the substance appear deliberate or accidental?
S ymptoms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is anyone exhibiting any symptoms? (such as stinging eyes?)
If suspicious ACT	
A	Avoid contact with material
C	Contaminated clothing... remove
T	Take medical advice

³ Under no circumstances should responders deliberately smell a substance as a means of determining whether it has an odour or not.

12. Appendix C – “Standard Response”

Actions

There is no requirement for Police officers responding to a standard response incident to wear CBRN Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

The decision whether Police resources attend a standard response will be with the Police Control Room.

Should Police resources be sent to a standard response, the first Police officer attending must make an early assessment of the scene and confirm that the standard response is the appropriate response level.

The classification of an incident as a standard response means that the Police will not routinely make a request for the attendance of any other emergency service to deal with the incident unless local arrangements exist, as per Section 5.3.2.

If the initial report originated from the Ambulance Service (AS) or Fire and Rescue Service (FRS), then the Police Control Room must re-contact both and inform them that Police have applied a standard response. They must then decide on the appropriate response from their agency.

13. Appendix D – “Amber Response”

By definition, the amber response implies that there is a reasonable suspicion of threat or risk associated with the incident.

- The Police Control Room should ensure that both the AS and FRS are aware and informed that the incident has been assessed as an ***“amber response to an incident involving a suspicious and potentially hazardous substance.”***

The **Police Control Room** should consider the following actions:

- Appoint a CBRN Commander and a CBRN Tactical Advisor and appraise them of the incident;
- Activate arrangements for use of Multi-Agency Interoperability Talk Group;
- Advise AS and FRS to notify their Duty NILO (or equivalent role) of the Communications Talk Group (or other suitable means of communication) in order to discuss deployment options with the Police CBRN Commander to resolve the incident proportionately;
- Consider the continued deployment of non-CBRN trained/equipped officers/staff to deliver an IOR according to the requirements of the incident.
- Carefully consider the initial information they have received, including the IA and reports from the IOR;

The **FRS and AS Control Rooms** should consider the following actions:

- Appoint a NILO/Tactical Advisor and appraise them of the incident;
- Activate arrangements for use of Multi-Agency Interoperability Talk Group;

- Advise their NILO/Tactical Advisor to make contact with the Police CBRN Commander/CBRN Tactical Advisor to information share and discuss deployment options to resolve the incident proportionately;

All other initial actions are contained within the IOR Guidance Document.

The multi-agency commanders, having liaised, must carry out a JDHA and agency specific DRAs before deploying resources to or into the scene.

The multi-agency commanders must determine the most appropriate resource and equipment required to be deployed to identify the item or substance. They must then decide on the correct level of PPE required to deal with the incident, in line with their own operating procedures. A safe system of work should be in place whereby there is a contingency plan in place to support any forward deployment

Consideration must be given to a forensic strategy should there be a likelihood for forensic recovery of any exhibits/productions, as per the requirements of the National Network of Laboratories (NNL).

Whilst this remains a priority for Police, this may not be matched by local Police capability to deploy into a contaminated environment to deliver this function of the response. Therefore the multi-agency group must find a joint approach that delivers a safe, proportionate and forensically aware capability into the scene, in the first instance, to try and identify the substance in situ. If identification is not possible in situ then the current information/intelligence should be reassessed, scientific advice sought and the activation of NNL considered as a priority.

14. Appendix E – “Red Response”

By definition, the red response implies that the incident is deemed to be a CBRN incident.

- Implementing a Red Response means that the circumstances are being treated as a genuine, terrorist instigated, CBRN incident.
- The Police Control Room should ensure that both the AS and FRS are aware and informed that the incident has been assessed as a **“red response to a CBRN incident.”**
- All control rooms must activate their CBRN contingency plans to deliver a proportionate specialist response as deemed necessary by the Multi-Agency Command Group.
- By definition the incident is now also a CT investigation and it is vital that any CT SIO is made fully aware of the multi-agency command group structure which is delivering the specialist resources to the scene to support this investigation.